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 Israel traditionally has been reluctant to build a large navy or to become a sea power. Nevertheless, the discovery of extensive natural gas fields in the eastern 
Mediterranean over the past decade has transformed the region further into a 
strategic powder keg that is drawing Israel out to sea. Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, 
Israel, and Lebanon disagree about the borders of their maritime exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZs), and they have attempted to impose their overlapping claims 
by force. The simmering conflicts have drawn in an array of regional powers. 
More recently, the United States has waded into the dispute; Russia is not far 
behind.
Israel’s discovery of large gas fields in its own offshore EEZ has brought it 
into geostrategic alignment with Cyprus and Greece. From a regional security 
standpoint, it is one of the most interesting actors. In some circles, Israel has 
been touted as a type of silver bullet that will 
solve the imbalance between the Hellenic states 
and Turkey. Israel’s new interest in the eastern 
Mediterranean has produced a small but quickly 
growing literature on Israel’s “turn to the sea.”1 The 
rapidly changing strategic situation has spurred 
the creation of research centers and high-profile 
working groups asking whether Israel can become 
a sea power. The answer to this question mostly 
has been an enthusiastic yes.2
Yet, historically, sea power—the ability to employ 
the sea in achieving national interests—has required 
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more than a shift in operational focus toward the maritime domain; it involves 
adopting a much broader national and strategic culture that is able to channel sig-
nificant resources away from the land and toward the sea. Israel has begun to take 
the sea more seriously and it has developed its offshore operational capabilities 
significantly over the past few decades; yet, for several reasons that this article will 
discuss, Israeli culture remains tied to the land rather than the sea. Using cultural 
and constructivist approaches to security that have emerged over the past few 
decades, this article will show why that fact will continue to create challenges for 
the development of Israeli sea power.3 Israel and its allies need to consider these 
cultural constraints when developing naval strategy, and they should factor them 
into discussions about how much they can expect Israel to contribute to resolving 
potential maritime conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean.
Much of the growing literature on Israel’s turn to the sea highlights Israel’s off-
shore interests. However, Israeli interests at sea are not new. Because the country 
lacks close relations with its neighbors—indeed, they often boycott it—99 percent 
of Israeli trade by volume travels by sea. Thus, geostrategically, Israel is equivalent 
to an island, and it always has been extremely vulnerable to maritime threats.4 As 
David Ben-Gurion himself stated, “There is no Land of Israel without the sea of 
Israel.”5 These threats are not hypothetical; Israel fought two wars (in 1956 and 
1967) largely over access to the sea.
Additionally, the recent focus on Israeli maritime affairs is not the first time 
that political leaders and strategic analysts have proclaimed a turn to the sea by 
Israel. On multiple occasions over several decades, Zionist leaders who recog-
nized Israel’s vital interests at sea announced that they finally had overcome the 
Jewish state’s “sea blindness.” Yet the need to make such claims repeatedly dem-
onstrates that the transition has never quite occurred. Throughout its history, 
Israel’s navalists have had to fight a culture deeply rooted in the land, one that was 
not willing to make the necessary terrestrial sacrifices to build sea power. Assess-
ing the viability of Israel’s current turn to the sea requires examining the cultural 
impediments that Israel has faced in the past and that it will need to overcome 
in the future. In doing so, culturist and constructivist approaches to security in 
the eastern Mediterranean provide much-needed insight on a topic that has been 
dominated by materialist approaches.
This article first will lay out the rising tensions in the eastern Mediterranean 
and, by extension, the stakes for Israel’s development of sea power. Next it will 
turn to a discussion of cultural approaches to the theory and history of sea power. 
This theoretical analysis of sea power largely is missing from the literature on 
Israel’s turn to the sea, but, as this article will argue, grappling with the concept 
is critically important if one wishes to discuss Israel’s attempt to play a larger role 
offshore. Then the article will discuss the tensions between the foundations of 
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Israeli national culture and the requirements of sea power. Finally the article will 
outline the cultural challenges that Israel has faced in obtaining sea power, and 
why many of those challenges likely will persist in the future.
THE STAKES
Before discussing cultural impediments to Israeli sea power, this article first 
must discuss the forces that currently are pulling Israel offshore and are making 
Israel’s ability to operate at sea increasingly relevant. Over the past decade, Israel, 
Cyprus, and Egypt have located and begun to exploit massive natural gas fields in 
their maritime EEZs. Until recently, most estimates have valued these discover-
ies in the hundreds of billions of dollars, if not more;6 the economic downturn 
caused by the coronavirus has reduced the projected value of the gas in the short 
term and, in some circles, has led to questions about the viability of some plans to 
exploit it. However, over the medium to long term, the gas still has the potential 
to transform energy markets, and it has reconfigured strategic alliances.7 It also 
has kindled instability and conflict; several confrontations at sea already have 
occurred, and a naval arms race has kicked off among several eastern Mediter-
ranean states. The United States and Russia increasingly are taking sides.
The contentions mainly stem from Turkey’s interpretations of international 
law, which put it at odds with other states in the region as well as with the inter-
national community more generally. Since 1982, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has formed the basis for international maritime 
law.8 UNCLOS designates territorial waters and maritime EEZs that govern re-
source exploitation at sea. However, because UNCLOS grants small islands the 
same rights as continental states, Turkey’s EEZ is limited by the presence of Greek 
islands around its coast. Therefore, Turkey rejects UNCLOS and claims an EEZ 
without consideration for islands.9
This problem is compounded by the Cyprus dispute. Turkey is the only state 
in the world that recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, located 
in the northeast part of the island, and the Turks have anointed themselves the 
guardians of the rights of Turkish Cypriots. As a result of these disputes, Turkey 
asserts a claim to offshore gas fields that the rest of the world recognizes as be-
longing to the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has turned to the use of force to defend 
its claims on Cypriot and Greek waters; Ankara repeatedly has sent its navy to 
prevent Nicosia and Athens, and international oil companies, from drilling for 
gas there. Meanwhile, Turkish warships are protecting Turkish oil companies as 
they illegally explore and drill in Cypriot waters.10
The Turkish navy traditionally has been the most powerful in the region. 
However, Cypriot interests in confronting Turkey over access to offshore gas have 
aligned Cyprus with powerful regional and international actors. Israel and Egypt 
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currently are exploiting large offshore gas fields in their EEZs. Like Turkey, Israel 
is not a signatory to UNCLOS, but, unlike Turkey, Israel abides by UNCLOS defi-
nitions of territorial seas and EEZs. The UNCLOS interpretation of these matters 
is the basis for agreements that Israel has signed with its maritime neighbors 
over the past decade. Offshore gas could prove transformative to the Israeli and 
Egyptian economies if the countries can export it to European markets. The most 
obvious, and cost-effective, way to do so is through a pipeline that runs through 
Turkey. However, both countries have rocky relationships with Ankara and do 
not feel comfortable tying their economic interests to a Turkish pipeline. As an 
alternative, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece want to establish an undersea pipeline that 
would run from the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean through Crete and up 
through Italy to supply the European continent.
The combination of shared energy interests and animosity toward Turkey 
has pulled Israel, Cyprus, and Greece into a close political alliance over the past 
decade.11 From the beginning, this alliance, sometimes termed the “Energy Tri-
angle,” has had a military component. In 2011 and 2012, Israel sent its air force to 
Cyprus in a show of force meant to support its new ally. Israeli jets buzzed Turk-
ish ships and entered what the Turks claim to be Northern Cyprus’s airspace. This 
caused Turkey to scramble its own air force to interdict Israeli aircraft.12 Israel 
and Greece also have begun to hold high-profile naval exercises in the region—a 
clear warning to the Turks.13 Increasingly, Turkish actions have pushed Egypt and 
Italy into the alliance with Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. Newly discovered Egyptian 
gas fields are adjacent to Cypriot and Israeli fields, so the three states have been 
cooperating closely, and together they formed a high-profile East Mediterra-
nean Gas Forum in Cairo in January 2020.14 Turkish interference in the area has 
disrupted Egyptian gas operations and pushed Egypt even closer to Cyprus and 
Israel. In response to negotiations between Cairo and Nicosia on using liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) to avoid the Turkish pipeline in February 2018, the Turkish 
navy blockaded ships from the Italian energy company ENI from reaching their 
drilling site in Cypriot waters. The effect of the Turkish action was the opposite of 
what Ankara had hoped for—it actually drove Cyprus and Egypt closer together. 
They rushed to sign an agreement on sending Cypriot gas to Egypt for conversion 
to LNG so it could be exported to Europe by ship rather than through a Turkish 
pipeline. Shortly afterward, Israel followed Cyprus’s lead and penned a deal with 
Egypt to do the same with its gas.15
Along with Israel, other regional actors have lined up against Turkey, espe-
cially after Ankara signed a deal with a semi-Islamist faction in the Libyan civil 
war in November 2019 to divide the central and eastern Mediterranean between 
them. In that deal, Turkey made a claim to seas that disregarded Greek islands 
and Cyprus. In defense of its European Union allies and international law, France 
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deployed its aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, “to defensively stalk Turkish frig-
ates sailing near to the contested gas fields close to Cyprus” in February 2020.16 
The United Arab Emirates, which opposes Turkish regional policies, particularly 
its actions in Libya, has become a strong supporter of Greece and Cyprus. Since 
2018, it has participated in the annual Greek-led military exercise INIOCHOS, 
along with the United States, Israel, Cyprus, Italy, and Egypt.17
As these tensions mount in the region, Israel is being drawn into a setting in 
which several states are expanding their navies. Turkey has embarked on what it 
describes as a transformative expansion of its fleet—already the most powerful 
in the region, as noted. By 2023, Turkey will put twenty-four new ships to sea, 
including four frigates and its first aircraft carrier, Anadolu. Turkey also is de-
veloping its domestic submarine program, and it is retrofitting its existing ships 
and submarines with new navigation, weapons, and propulsion systems. In an 
attempt to transform itself into a true sea power, Turkey has emphasized that this 
naval construction is being accomplished by domestic Turkish industries. And, 
as other sea powers have done, Turkey is developing educational, cultural, and 
media institutions to drive public support for its anticipated emergence as a great 
power on the sea.18
The Turks will not be the first state in the region to acquire an aircraft car-
rier; that honor goes to Egypt. The Egyptian navy also has expanded its fleet 
considerably over the past decade, including by acquiring several German-built 
submarines. France had built two Mistral-class helicopter carriers for Russia but 
canceled their delivery in response to Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. Egypt 
stepped in to buy the two ships, which it now operates as Gamal Abdel Nasser 
and Anwar el-Sadat.19
Israel also is in the process of updating its fleet, as part of its turn to the sea. 
Most importantly, it is acquiring a new class of German-built corvette, the Sa’ar 
6, which will be the most advanced surface vessel in the Israeli fleet. Israel also is 
updating its older Sa’ar 4.5 and Sa’ar 5 corvettes, and it has acquired very capable 
Dolphin 2–class submarines from Germany as well.20
On top of these local developments, several outside powers have become in-
creasingly involved in the eastern Mediterranean region. The European Union 
and the United States have criticized Turkish actions harshly and have come 
down strongly in support of the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek energy triangle as well 
as the Egyptian-led East Mediterranean Gas Forum. In the summer of 2019, 
an influential, bipartisan group of U.S. senators and representatives introduced 
the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, which 
codifies American support for Greece and Cyprus at the expense of Turkey. It 
also offers military aid to both Cyprus and Greece. Then, in October 2019, Sec-
retary of State Michael R. Pompeo flew to Greece to announce plans to expand 
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the U.S. naval presence there and to turn Greek bases into an alternative to 
Turkish bases for American operations. He also announced a deal to develop 
supply channels to NATO allies in eastern Europe that run through Greece 
rather than along the historical routes through Turkey. Pompeo made clear 
“that operations in international waters are governed by a set of rules” and that 
“[w]e’ve told the Turks that illegal drilling is unacceptable.”21 This language, along 
with the expanding American military presence in the region, can only be read 
in Ankara as a tacit threat.
On the other side, Turkey is not the only country that is being cut out of the 
new gas deals. Russia has its own pipelines, through which it supplies over 50 
percent of most European Union states’ gas needs. Thereby Russia can hold Eu-
ropean energy markets hostage, and in the past Moscow has used these pipelines 
to exert political influence on the continent.22 Any eastern Mediterranean gas 
deals that cut out Turkey and Russia not only would hurt those two countries 
financially but would threaten their geopolitical positions. Unsurprisingly, the 
gas deals have pushed the two countries closer together and facilitated already- 
budding defense cooperation between them. Some analysts have begun to specu-
late that Russia might back Turkey not only politically but militarily in the grow-
ing regional disputes, including over gas in the eastern Mediterranean.23
Finally, Iran has sought to establish a corridor to the Mediterranean to sup-
port its allies and proxies in Syria and Lebanon. The most important Iranian asset 
in the Levant is Lebanese Hezbollah, which looks to Tehran for both religious 
and political guidance. Lebanon, which is increasingly dominated by Hezbollah, 
hopes to discover its own gas fields in its EEZ. Lebanon has an unresolved mari-
time border dispute with Israel; although this does not affect Israel’s proven gas 
fields, it would affect future exploration. Hezbollah, for which Iran is helping to 
build irregular naval capabilities in the eastern Mediterranean, rejects Israel’s 
existence and has threatened Israel’s offshore gas infrastructure.24 As the civil war 
in Syria winds down, both Iran and Russia are likely to use their gains in Syria to 
play a larger role at sea in the eastern Mediterranean. This almost certainly will 
raise regional tensions.
In sum, the stakes for Israel in the eastern Mediterranean are high. The dis-
covery of gas has reconfigured geopolitical alignments, pitting Israel, Cyprus, 
Greece, Egypt, the European Union, and the United States against Turkey, Russia, 
Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah. The rising tensions already have been militarized, and 
unresolved disputes over waters with billions of dollars of gas under them easily 
could turn into open conflict.25 Israel possesses one of the most powerful mili-
taries in the region, but traditionally it has not been a sea power. Whether it can 
and will turn to the sea will have important implications for this highly volatile 
region. Yet, if history is a judge, Israel will need to do more than buy new naval 
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platforms; a true turn to the sea will require a major shift in Israel’s national and 
strategic culture.
SEA POWER AND CULTURE
The relationship between culture and sea power is not new, and it is not limited 
to Israel. Over a century ago, the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan 
famously laid out six elements of sea power. Most of those elements dealt with 
ports, population size, geography (Switzerland will never be a sea power), and 
the willingness of the government to support a navy. However, one of Mahan’s 
elements (number five on his list) dealt with a more amorphous subject: “national 
character.” As Mahan argued, a state can have all the attributes of a sea power, 
but if its people lack a certain national character that pushes them toward the sea, 
that state will have difficulty achieving its interests in that domain.26 It would be 
easy to dismiss this aspect of Mahanian sea power as rooted in racial and racist 
ideas of the later nineteenth century; indeed, Mahan’s contemporaries openly 
discussed certain races as being inherently better suited for the sea.27 It is unclear 
to what extent these racial notions influenced Mahan, but even if they did they 
are not the only way to interpret his concept of national character.
National character just as easily can be viewed through the lens of culture, 
and more-recent sea-power theorists have done just that. Geoffrey Till points 
out that, since ancient times, seafaring communities have developed a distinc-
tive culture—one that can be found across both time and space all over the 
world. He gives an example of the Vikings having it in their “spirit of adventure, 
enterprise, curiosity, and greed.”28 Likewise, the retired USN admiral turned 
sea-power intellectual James G. Stavridis describes the “uncertainty and sense of 
adventure” that “sailors have felt going back two thousand years or more.”29 These 
sentiments are remarkably similar to the “healthy excitement of exploration and 
adventure” that Mahan argued is an important element of the national character 
needed for sea power.30 Andrew Lambert, one of the most accomplished naval 
historians currently active, goes even further; in fact, he criticizes Mahan for not 
putting enough emphasis on the cultural aspects of sea power. He argues that 
sea power requires “actively constructing a cultural identity focused on the sea.” 
Historically, sea powers not only built ships and ports but infused their cultures 
with nautical themes. Their art, architecture, and public spaces highlighted the 
role of the sea in the national character, and, as Lambert shows, eventually “this 
consciously crafted identity spread beyond elites and interested parties: it flowed 
into popular culture, pottery, coins, graffiti, books, printed images, and, by the 
1930s, cinema.”31
In some sense, sea-power culture is a necessary but artificial social construct 
for states that want to dominate the water. It is necessary because most people 
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are not naturally inclined to focus on the sea; after all, they live on the land, and 
their most immediate interests—and their military objectives in times of war—
most often are on land rather than at sea.32 Moreover, navies are expensive and 
take considerable time to build. Sea powers require not only ships and sailors but 
shipyards, ports, and skilled engineers. At best, these requirements take decades 
to produce. Navies also require manpower that is more technically skilled than 
what armies require, which means it is more difficult for a navy to rely on reserve 
forces or a draft to fill its ranks. As a result, it is much more difficult to create and 
maintain navies than ground forces.
Leaders promoting sea power, therefore, need to spend considerable effort to 
convince their people that they should invest limited resources in a sea service. 
For example, when Theodore Roosevelt, who was heavily influenced by Mahan, 
wanted to build American sea power, he spent considerable time and effort rais-
ing public support for the U.S. Navy—for instance, by sending the Great White 
Fleet to circumnavigate the globe in 1907–1909.33
Roosevelt also created naval heroes onto whom the public could latch.34 In 
1905, Roosevelt had the body of the Revolutionary War sea captain John Paul 
Jones exhumed from a long-forgotten grave in Paris. Jones’s body was returned to 
the United States, where it was reinterred, with great public fanfare, in a massive 
tomb on the grounds of the U.S. Naval Academy.35 Jones was a genuine war hero, 
but after the Revolutionary War he left the United States to serve in the Russian 
navy and died in obscurity in France. As a recent biographer of Jones has argued, 
one of the reasons he was “resurrected” was that “Teddy Roosevelt needed a 
hero.”36 Roosevelt understood that creating such heroes was essential for building 
among the masses a culture of sea power that would support his naval ambitions. 
He was right; throughout history, people lacking admiration for the sea have resist-
ed government efforts to build sea power. Therefore strategies to build sea power 
often are controversial; at times they can rip apart a state’s political leadership, 
sometimes literally—in the seventeenth century, the Dutch sea-power enthusiast 
Johan de Witt was “torn to pieces in the streets of the Hague” by those who were 
tired of his focus on the sea and wanted to return to their land-based interests.37
The difficulties in building sea power for a country such as Israel are com-
pounded by the distinction between large and small navies. If a state cannot or 
will not invest enough to become a full-fledged sea power, its navy almost imme-
diately faces several problems. Seafaring requires numerous, technical skill sets, 
but if a navy has only a few ships it often is difficult for sailors to get enough time 
at sea. Even for those who do, the opportunities for career progression and senior 
leadership are limited. Thus, it becomes difficult to retain the most talented sail-
ors. Moreover, because there are only a few senior positions in small navies, the 
departure of leaders has an outsize effect.38
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Relatedly, as Till points out, “[n]avies survive and prosper partly through their 
ability to have an appreciable impact on the defence decision-making processes 
which define a country’s maritime policy.” But with few senior officers, “there 
are fewer people with the necessary professional experience to influence, even 
help shape, policy at the national level.” As a result, national policy “becomes less 
likely to serve naval purposes. Instead, the navy simply gets told what its policy 
is.”39 Such a situation clearly is not ideal for addressing predominantly maritime 
problems.
Finally, navies in non-sea-power states face problems with economies of 
scale. The fewer ships a state has, the costlier each individual ship is to produce, 
maintain, and refit and the more expensive it is to train and equip the sailors who 
man them. As a result, such states often are forced to outsource production and 
professional military education. In many cases, this reliance on other states can 
limit the strategies and policies of non–sea powers severely because their allies 
hold significant leverage over them. Moreover, non–sea powers with small navies 
often need to choose between spreading their limited resources thinly over a wide 
range of capabilities and building real competency in a limited number of areas 
while hoping that their allies will fill in the gaps. Neither approach is ideal, and 
the latter choice likewise exposes small navies to strategic constraints imposed 
by their partners.40
Almost all the problems associated with small navies and a lack of sea-power 
culture have hindered the development of the Israeli navy. These obstacles likely 
will persist in the future.
THE SEA, THE LAND, AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF  
ZIONIST IMAGINATION
In contrast to the culture of sea power, the Zionist ideology on which the modern 
state of Israel was founded is rooted deeply in interests on the land. Zionists tra-
ditionally have read Jewish history through the relationship between the Jewish 
people and Eretz Yisrael (the biblical Land of Israel). Such a reading of history 
aligns with a general perception that Jews are not a seafaring people.41
Of course, such reductive narratives are not as straightforward as their propo-
nents suggest. Over the past few decades, a stream of revisionist scholarship has 
uncovered or given new emphasis to Jewish experiences related to the sea. Jews 
have traveled, explored, and made their living on the sea from ancient times until 
the present.42 In contrast to popular perceptions of Jews as meek, city-dwelling 
scholars and merchants, there were even some swashbuckling Jewish pirates in 
the Caribbean.43
Therefore the Zionist focus on land represents a constructed identity rather 
than the articulation of an innate characteristic of the Jewish people. This does 
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not make Zionist narratives any less powerful in shaping the national ethos of 
modern Israel. To understand that ethos, and the obstacles it presents to creating 
sea power, it is necessary to detail how and why Zionist narratives about the con-
nection between Jews and the land were created.
Throughout Jewish history, one finds a longing for a return to Eretz Yisrael, 
and across the centuries numerous Jews acted on that impulse. However, modern 
forms of political and cultural Zionism have their roots in nineteenth-century 
Europe, where the place of Jews, never completely secure, became increasingly 
dire. The rise of European nationalism and Romantic ideas about a Volk rooted 
in the land threw into sharp contrast stereotypical depictions of “the wandering 
Jew,” who spoke a different language (predominantly Yiddish), ate different (ko-
sher) food, adhered to peculiar customs, and claimed roots in the Middle East. 
Some Jews sought a solution to their predicament by creating a nation-state of 
their own in what they considered to be their ancient homeland. In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, this movement became known as Zionism.
In addition to the political goal of creating a Jewish state in Jews’ perceived 
homeland, Zionism also developed a cultural component. Zionists attempted 
to fashion what they called the “new Jew,” who contrasted sharply with the 
stereotypical Diaspora Jew. Once Jews returned to their homeland, Zionists 
would work in industries such as agriculture. Toiling in the fields would develop 
physically strong bodies and root these new Jews in their land. This rootedness, 
according to Zionist ideology, would solve many of the problems Jews had faced 
as perennial outsiders in every land they had inhabited since the Roman Empire 
exiled them from Judea.44 Yet this desire for rootedness was in direct conflict 
with the veneration of wanderlust, exploration, and adventure that normally ac-
companies sea power.
Zionists’ desire to be rooted in a homeland dovetailed with their reading of 
biblical history. The heartlands of ancient Jewish kingdoms were located among 
the inland mountains and valleys of ancient Judea, Samaria, and the Galilee; the 
coastal areas largely were controlled by Philistines, Greeks, and Phoenicians. 
Thus, as one might assume, the ancient Israelites were concerned far more with 
the land than the sea.
The Bible discusses land and agriculture extensively; it is far less concerned 
with nautical matters. This focus on the land is reflected not only in biblical nar-
ratives but in the content of the ancient Hebrew language itself. Although the He-
brew Bible discusses warfare at length, it does not even provide a word for navy. 
When modern Zionists turned to ancient Jewish texts for other nautical terms, 
they struggled to find them. They had to invent terms such as ma’agan (anchor-
age), hashaka (launching a ship), saver (dock worker), and shayit (sailing).45 By 
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contrast, biblical Hebrew is infused with vocabulary linking the ancient Israelites 
to the land. At the most basic level, the Hebrew words for land/soil (adama) and 
man (adam) are closely related. In root-based Semitic languages such as Hebrew, 
this relationship is much more meaningful than it would be in English—it sug-
gests a common essence.
Modern Zionist culture did not grow organically from a deterministic bibli-
cal past. However, when Zionists wanted to tie themselves to a land, it was not 
difficult for them to find justifications in biblical history, and as Zionism devel-
oped, politically and culturally, its proponents increasingly emphasized the links 
between Jews and the land—between adam and adama. Thus, writing in 1919, 
the influential Zionist intellectual Harry Sacher wrote, “The idea of Judaism is 
inseparable from the idea of the Jewish people, and the idea of the Jewish people 
is inseparable from the idea of the Jewish land.” He tied together religious, politi-
cal, cultural, and linguistic themes, referencing Jewish sages, and arguing, “The 
cultivation of the Hebrew tongue is as natural as the cultivation of the land.”46 The 
kibbutzim (plural of kibbutz, a collective agricultural settlement), in which the 
Zionist “new Jews” tilled the soil, featured heavily in the early Zionist literature.47 
Hebrew writers wrestled with overcoming the image of the diasporic wandering 
Jew and putting down roots in the land.48 Early Zionist art and photography dealt 
with similar themes. In 1935, the first Hebrew-language movie, Zot Hi HaAretz 
(This Is the Land), explored images of adam and adama.49 The celebration of the 
new Jew, who developed his mind and body by pouring blood and sweat into the 
soil of his homeland—making the “desert bloom”—permeated popular culture. A 
line from a folk song that later became a type of national slogan proclaimed “Anu 
banu artzah livnot ve-lehibanot bah” (We came to the Land to build and be built 
by it).50 Similarly, a 1937 poem that, when put to music, became an “unofficial 
anthem” for Zionists’ agricultural settlements captures the emotions tied up in 
the return both to an ancient homeland and to working the land.51
Watch, look, and see
How great this day is
Fire glowing in the chest
And the plow
Again tilling the field.52
Of course, Zionist thought could not ignore the sea completely. Most Jews had 
to travel by sea to reach Eretz Yisrael, and a subset of Hebrew literature emerged 
representing that experience.53 However, as often as not the sea was simply “a barrier 
that had to be crossed before arriving at the shores of the new country”; it was not 
essential for building a new national identity.54 There were no portrayals of the sea 
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in early Zionist culture that could compete with the place of the land in the emerg-
ing national consciousness.55 As one scholar of Zionist culture put it, “The history 
of Zionist efforts to elaborate the dialectical relation between Jew and land in no 
small measure defines the entire history of the movement between 1881 and 1938.”56
ISRAEL’S REPEATED TURNS TO THE SEA
The overwhelming focus of early Zionist culture on the land rather than the sea 
did not align with the geographic realities of Jewish settlement. In the biblical pe-
riod, to which Zionists looked for inspiration, Jewish populations, as noted, were 
concentrated in the interior mountains, while non-Jewish populations were con-
centrated along the coast. By contrast, while some modern Zionist Jews settled in 
and around the Jerusalem highlands, most settlement occurred in an N-shaped 
pattern up the coast, diagonally southeast through the Galilee, and then north 
around the Sea of Galilee into the Hula Valley. The main Jewish population cen-
ters, such as Tel Aviv (founded in 1909), were on the Mediterranean coast.57 The 
gap between the imagined geography of Eretz Yisrael and the geographic reality 
of Zionist settlement created a type of cognitive dissonance. For example, a 1939 
short story written in simple Hebrew for new immigrants depicts the surprise of 
a Jewish refugee from Europe when he arrives in Tel Aviv. He was in “the land of 
the Patriarchs, the revived homeland,” but “[h]ere, on the beach . . . everything 
was so ordinary, just like in Europe.” The idea of the ancient land that he expected 
contrasted sharply with the Mediterranean reality of his new life.58
These geographic realities gradually began to impose the sea on the Zionist 
movement, and in the 1930s one finds the first claims that Zionists had turned to 
the sea. During this period, Zionists opened a Jewish-run port in Tel Aviv, devel-
oped fisheries, formed maritime leagues, inaugurated a nautical school in Haifa, 
and established private shipping companies.59 In 1938, Raphael Patai added in-
tellectual weight to this project when he published a book in Hebrew on ancient 
Jewish seafaring. The book was based on a doctoral dissertation that completed 
the first PhD that the Hebrew University of Jerusalem had awarded.60 David Ben-
Gurion, who emerged as the most important Zionist political leader at this time, 
realized that the Zionists’ almost-exclusive focus on the land was misaligned with 
the strategic imperatives of the developing Jewish state. Not only was the sea a 
geographic reality that forced itself on the Jewish settlements clustered along the 
coast, but as the surrounding Arab states emerged from colonial empires Israel 
became a geostrategic island. Thus, the sea became the only outlet Zionists had 
to the rest of the world. Ben-Gurion therefore argued, “The conquest of the soil 
by city people was the great, first adventure of our movement, of our endeavour 
in the country. A second adventure, great also, and perhaps harder than the first, 
still awaits us—the conquest of the sea.” For Ben-Gurion, the Mediterranean was 
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“the natural bridge that connects our small country with the wide world. The 
sea is an organic, economic, and political part of our country.” This being the 
case, “[t]he road to the sea is a way to expand our country, to augment our eco-
nomic base, to strengthen our national health, to enforce our political position, 
to dominate the elements.”61 At the time, Zionist leaders presented the “conquest 
of the sea” as the third pillar of Zionism, along with “redemption of the land” 
and “revival of the soul.”62 By 1945, in recognition of their geographic situation, 
the Zionists overcame considerable political challenges to establish the shipping 
company ZIM. This commercial shipping capability would prove crucial in safe-
guarding Israel’s trade in the decades ahead, and ZIM eventually developed into 
one of the world’s leading shipping lines.63 As a result of these developments, a 
historian of modern Israel has argued recently that the prestate Jewish movement 
went through a “maritime revolution” during the 1930s and 1940s.64
Yet despite this supposed turn to the sea, in 1948 a newly independent Israel 
found itself completely unprepared in terms of resources, training, equipment, 
and—just as importantly—mentality to confront the challenges it faced at sea 
during its war of independence. Following World War II, Jewish communities in 
Israel developed a naval militia called the Palyam, and Zionists—with a great deal 
of help from both Jewish and non-Jewish sympathizers abroad—smuggled Ho-
locaust survivors past a British blockade in a program known as Aliyah Bet. The 
most famous of these Aliyah Bet ships was Exodus, which the British boarded. 
They killed and injured several passengers and sent the Holocaust survivors back 
to Europe.65
As independence neared, Zionist leaders attempted to turn these initiatives 
into a national navy. As one member of the Palyam later recalled, the leadership 
brought him and other members into a meeting and “informed us that we were 
no longer the Palyam; we were now the Israeli Navy.”66 The Jews had a hundred 
miles of coast to protect, in addition to their shipping. Yet while Palyam mem-
bers were dedicated and daring, they were trained and equipped only to carry 
out small commando raids; they did not possess the technical knowledge to run 
a navy. In addition to their lack of ship-handling experience on large vessels, 
they had no experience in the command and control that is essential for naval 
operations.67 In a sign of how desperate the Israelis were for competent naval 
leadership, Ben-Gurion cabled a Zionist office in New York, asking it to send 
a twenty-six-year-old Jewish American named Paul N. Shulman. Shulman had 
graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and had fought on a destroyer in the 
Pacific during World War II. Despite his age, Ben-Gurion wanted him to com-
mand HaSherut HaYami (the Sea Service), which is what the Israelis called it at 
the time, because they had not settled on a Hebrew word for navy yet. Shulman 
recruited several other American Jews with naval experience to take key jobs that 
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the Israelis could not fill. Jonathan Leff, who was one of Shulman’s classmates at 
Annapolis, became head of the Department of Ordnance and Gunnery of the Sea 
Service; Harold Gershenow, who had served as a ship-repair officer in the U.S. 
Navy during World War II, was brought to Israel to rebuild and operate the Bat 
Galim port at Haifa; Harold Shugar, who had served as a gunnery officer in the 
American navy and happened to be studying abroad at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem when the war broke out, was recruited to be the gunnery officer on the 
Israeli flagship.68 The head of the Palyam became Shulman’s deputy, and together 
they opened a training program at Haifa.
Yet despite the turn to the sea that supposedly had occurred over the preceding 
decade, the land-focused leadership of the Israel Defense Forces did not prioritize 
the sea and did not attempt to use it strategically. Its members derided Shulman’s 
force as “the bathtub corps.” The navy had only three real ships: two former 
Canadian corvettes and a former U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker. The icebreaker, 
renamed Eilat, became Shulman’s flagship. None of these ships was armed, so the 
Israelis mounted a 1906 French army field-artillery piece on the deck of Eilat.69
The fledgling Israeli navy had difficulty convincing the national leadership to 
provide it with resources. Of course, the new state had limited assets it could offer 
the navy, especially in wartime, but the lack of available funds only partly explains 
the failure to support the navy. Money was available, but the civilian leadership 
saw no use in spending it on the sea service. The official responsible for the 
navy at the Ministry of Defense, Gershon Zak, had a background in education 
administration. Zak rejected Shulman’s repeated requests for funds to build a 
communications station, so Shulman asked for money for a cultural center. This 
request was more aligned with Zak’s interests, and it was approved. Shulman then 
“misappropriated” the funds to build the communications station.70 This would 
not be the last time that Israeli naval leaders misled or ignored their superiors 
outside the sea service to accomplish their missions and protect the vital interests 
of the state.71
The Israeli navy did achieve a few important successes during the war. Most 
importantly, a commando raid carried out via a small boat launched from Shul-
man’s flagship sank the Egyptian flagship, Emir Farouk.72 Yet the Israeli navy 
never was used to its full potential. Many Israelis saw Shulman, who was the most 
competent naval officer, as a typical Diaspora Jew rather than the “new Jew” of 
the Zionist project. He was forced to step down following the war and largely was 
written out of Israeli history.73
Following Israeli independence, the national ethos remained firmly rooted in 
the land. In a major cultural landmark, the first play performed in the new state 
was Moshe Shamir’s highly acclaimed Hu Halakh ba-Sadot (He Walked through 
the Fields). It later was transformed into a successful Hebrew movie. As the title 
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indicates, the plot revolves around life on a kibbutz, with all the resulting imagery 
of adam and adama.74 Probably the most important influence on postindepen-
dence Israeli culture has been the writings of Amos Oz, who burst onto the He-
brew literary scene in the 1960s with a collection of short stories describing life 
on a kibbutz.75 The relationship between Zionist Jews and the land permeated his 
career.76 In recent decades, agriculture and kibbutzim have lost their central role 
in Israel, but they remain an important part of the state’s founding myth, as well 
as a cultural force. For example, Oz ultimately cemented his place in Israeli liter-
ary history with a 2002 memoir about his own journey as a boy from the life of a 
city Jew in Jerusalem to a truly Zionist life on an agricultural collective. Notably, 
when he left the city and rooted himself in the land he changed his surname from 
the Yiddish Klausner to the Hebrew Oz, thus completing the Zionist transforma-
tion. The book made a tremendous impact, and in 2015 the Israeli American 
actress Natalie Portman transformed it into a Hebrew-language movie in which 
she played a central role, that of young Amos’s mother.77
As one might expect, this continued cultural affinity for the land affected the 
resources and attention that the young Israeli navy received from the state. As 
one prominent Israeli defense analyst has noted, in the first few decades of Israel’s 
statehood “[t]he [Israel Defense Forces] headquarters had little understanding of 
naval needs and was not inclined to divert scarce funds to a service considered to 
be of secondary importance.”78 In the 1950s, the Israelis attempted to build a navy 
around capital ships (mostly British destroyers) and they purchased WWII-era 
British submarines. However, the destroyers proved too expensive to man and 
run. Moreover, they failed to achieve Israeli objectives at sea. Following the 1948 
war, Egypt closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, which blocked passage 
from Israel’s southern port of Elat to the Red Sea. Egypt also prevented Israel from 
using the Suez Canal. These actions cut Israeli ties with Asia and hindered the 
development of its southern Negev region, which was a priority for Ben-Gurion.
Reopening the strait and Israel’s access to the Red Sea became one of the 
country’s main objectives when it joined Britain and France in the 1956 war 
against Egypt. Israeli forces raced down the Sinai Peninsula and captured Sharm 
al-Sheikh, which overlooks the strait. Israel then made opening of the waterway 
a key provision for handing the territory back to Egypt, and it took the oppor-
tunity to send a few Israeli navy ships through the straits to Elat. Under intense 
American and international pressure, Israel withdrew from the Sinai without 
clear Egyptian acquiescence to Israel’s right of passage by sea. Subsequently, only 
foreign ships were allowed through the straits; if an Israeli ship wished to pass, 
it needed to fly a false flag. The Israeli warships that transited to Elat during the 
crisis remained bottled up there until the 1967 war. Therefore the Israeli navy was 
not able to secure sea lines of communication for vital Israeli shipping (which by 
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the 1960s included much-needed oil shipments from Iran). When Egypt decided 
to close the straits completely in 1967, Israel had no naval option to open them.79 
In such situations, states with small navies often rely on alliances with sea powers, 
and the Israelis turned to the United States. However, while the Americans were 
supportive, they were tied down in Vietnam, and they could not muster interna-
tional support to force the issue.80 To regain access to the sea, Israel was forced 
into a general war rather than a more limited naval action.
The year 1967 was a low point for the Israeli navy, for several reasons. It largely 
missed out on the celebrated actions of what Israelis call the Six-Day War in June. 
Other than some small commando raids, the only major action the Israeli navy 
took was to attack USS Liberty, an American signals-intelligence-collection plat-
form. Several dozen Americans were killed or injured in the attack. The Israelis 
insist the attack was a mistake, but it remains a contentious topic for some in the 
U.S. Navy today.81 Later in the year, the Israeli destroyer Eilat was sunk by a Soviet 
Styx missile fired from an Egyptian missile boat. Then, right after the New Year, 
an Israeli submarine on its maiden voyage from England to Israel disappeared 
along the way.82
Fortunately for the Israeli navy, brighter days were on the horizon. Israeli 
navalists understood the critical national interests Israel had at sea, yet the state 
provided them relatively few resources. Yet as the adage states, necessity is the 
mother of invention, and in the mid-1960s Israeli naval officers developed a bold 
plan to scrap Israel’s destroyers and replace them with heavily armed missile 
boats. No Western navy relied on missile boats at the time, so this was a fairly 
radical plan—even more so because when the Israeli navy decided on this course, 
it had yet to develop a surface-to-surface missile and it had no platform on which 
to put it.83
Eventually, the Israelis developed the Gabriel missile and the Germans agreed 
to build them a modified version of their Jaguar-class fast-attack craft. As theo-
rists of small navies have argued, reliance on foreign procurement can be prob-
lematic because it ties strategic assets to the whims of international politics, and 
that proved to be the case for Israel and its missile boats. The Germans worried 
that the Arabs would boycott them if it became public that they were building 
missile boats for Israel; however, the Israelis were able to convince Germany to 
allow the French to build the German boats in the port of Cherbourg. Because of 
the war in Algeria, the French were out of favor with the Arabs anyway, so they 
did not face a diplomatic threat.84
But before the boats were completed, the international political winds shifted. 
Following the French withdrawal from Algeria, President Charles de Gaulle at-
tempted to mend ties with the Arab states, and Israel was left in the lurch. The 
French imposed an embargo on arms to Israel, which meant they would not 
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permit Israel to take possession of the new missile boats on which its entire naval 
strategy depended. In a major scandal at the time, the Israelis tricked the French 
into thinking they had sold their rights to the boats to a Norwegian shipping 
company. Then, on Christmas Eve 1969, the Israelis escaped with the boats into a 
storm in the English Channel. Israeli officers and crew, many of whom had been 
hiding belowdecks in the French harbor, piloted the boats back to Haifa, refueling 
at sea from modified Israeli merchant ships and dodging the French, Soviet, and 
Egyptian navies along the way.85
Once in Israel, the boats were fitted with the Gabriel missile system. The 
Gabriel’s range was far shorter than that of the Soviet Styx missile, which the 
Egyptian and Syrian navies used. This meant that the Israeli boats would be 
shot out of the water before they fired their own missiles at their adversaries. 
Again, necessity bred innovation, and Israeli engineers developed a revolutionary 
electronic-warfare system, mostly using chaff, that was able to spoof the Styx mis-
siles and allow Israeli ships to operate within their range.86
During the 1973 war with Syria and Egypt, the Israeli missile boats performed 
beyond all expectations. In the battle of Latakia, Israeli and Syrian boats engaged 
in history’s first missile battle at sea. The Israeli boats were able to operate safely 
within the range of the Soviet missiles and they sank all five of the Syrian boats 
that took part in the battle. Later in the war, the Israelis repeated their successes 
against Egyptian missile boats in the battle of Baltīm. Over the course of the war, 
the Egyptians and Syrians fired over fifty missiles at the Israeli boats, but none 
hit their targets; by contrast, the Israelis were able to sink any Syrian or Egyptian 
vessel that ventured out of port. The Israelis used this command of the sea to 
bombard strategic targets on the Egyptian and Syrian coasts as well as to ensure 
the vital resupply of weapons by sea from the United States.87 In addition to these 
victories in the Mediterranean, Israeli naval commandos achieved important 
victories around the Sinai and the Red Sea.88 As a result, some have heralded the 
acquisition of these missile boats as a turning point for the Israeli navy.89
However, this turning point should not be misconstrued as signifying a new 
age for the Israeli defense establishment’s relationship with the sea. While the Is-
raeli navy did achieve a number of stunning successes in the war, those successes 
came despite the fact that Israel’s political and military leadership was inept at 
using the sea service. David Elazar, the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, 
planned to use the navy in the war simply to “defend essential targets along the 
length of the state’s coast and to be on alert to transition quickly to attack the 
enemy on the sea and in the ports.”90 Basically, all he wanted the navy to do was 
prevent Egyptian or Syrian boats from coming close enough to launch their mis-
siles at the Israeli coast. On the first night of the war, he ordered Benjamin Telem, 
the commander of the navy, to recall a naval force that was heading north toward 
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Syria; he did not want the navy to get into a situation that would have required 
the diversion of land or air forces. Telem, in a daring—and potentially career-
ending—move, chose to ignore the order. The force in question won the battle 
of Latakia and shaped the war at sea—but it did so in defiance of Israeli military 
leadership, not because of it. Elazar later admitted, “I underestimated the navy.”91
While the more than doubling of Israel’s coastline resulting from the 1967 
war forced the state to provide the navy with more assets, even this did not occur 
without a fight. The government rejected the navy’s additional request to build a 
fleet of landing craft following the 1967 war. Israeli navalists regarded this deci-
sion as “a grave blunder,” and because of it the army faced significant difficulties 
crossing the Suez Canal during the 1973 war. As Efraim Inbar has stated, “The 
government was still ground-oriented and not inclined, either by doctrine or 
budget, to approve large amphibious operations.”92 The war exposed other prob-
lems with the navy as well. Although the Israelis controlled the Strait of Tiran, the 
Israeli navy could not prevent the Egyptians from blockading the Bab el Mandeb 
choke point at the southern end of the Red Sea, essentially cutting off Israel’s con-
nections with Asia and Africa. The Egyptians also successfully mined the Strait 
of Jubal in the Gulf of Suez. By doing so, they cut off Israeli oil supplies from Abu 
Rudeis. This highlighted the Israeli navy’s inability to minesweep.93 Moreover, it 
should not be forgotten just how close Israel was to not having its missile boats 
because of its diplomatic situation; although the Israelis managed to smuggle the 
boats out of France in the middle of the night, it was a close-run thing, and the 
operation could have been upended in numerous ways. It certainly is not a model 
to be replicated.
Nevertheless, the war did demonstrate, even to those who did not understand 
the service fully, that the Israeli navy could play a constructive role. Although 
Israeli political and military leaders have remained wary about pulling resources 
from land and air forces over the years, several optimistic navalists have argued 
repeatedly that Israel finally is turning to the sea. Such claims have come every 
decade since the 1970s. In the 1980s, Efraim Inbar argued that Israel reached 
a new phase in its relationship with the sea after the navy won a hard-fought, 
multiyear battle to enact a reform and modernization program, which included 
the purchase of American-built Sa’ar 5 corvettes, which were considerably larger 
than the missile boats on which Israel had relied since the 1960s.94 Other scholars 
argue that, although for “most of Israel’s seven-decades-long history the sea did 
not play a significant role in Israeli security, energy market, or development poli-
cies, . . . beginning in the 1990s, Israeli decision makers turned their attention to 
the sea.” These scholars state that this turn to the sea was tied to an accumulation 
of issues such as fisheries, environmental concerns, desalination, offshore energy, 
and the development of seaports; together, these and other interests created a 
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critical mass that finally pushed Israel to the sea.95 Another analyst claims that 
Israel finally began to take the sea seriously in 2006, when Hezbollah hit the Is-
raeli corvette Hanit with an Iranian-supplied cruise missile.96 And finally, there 
are the claims that, after decades of neglect, signs of Israel finally turning to the 
sea include the discovery of offshore gas fields; the new alliances with Greece and 
Cyprus; and the purchase of a new, larger class of Sa’ar 6 corvettes from Germany.
Arguments supporting Israel’s various supposed turns to the sea have high-
lighted the very real progress the Israeli navy has made over the past few decades. 
However, each step forward has been a struggle, and despite some advances 
Israel has not resolved its strategic maritime issues. A 2018 report on the Israeli 
navy argues that “[t]he Israeli Navy currently has far fewer corvettes and fast at-
tack craft than it requires, and almost all of these have never been fully outfitted 
with their designed number of fire-control systems.” In addition, limited missile 
reloads for Israel’s otherwise very capable submarines limit their ability to act as 
a deterrent.97
Moreover, while Israel has developed its naval shipbuilding industry, the Israe-
li navy continues to rely on foreign sources for its capital ships and submarines, 
which means its future fleet relies on a favorable diplomatic landscape.98 Support 
for Israel remains controversial in many states. Recently, even in the United 
States—which traditionally has been Israel’s greatest supporter—some political 
factions have questioned the American relationship with the Jewish state. Until 
Israel resolves the Palestinian issue, it likely will face continued international 
political opposition that easily could hinder its procurement of future platforms 
or limit its strategic options at critical times. Until Israel develops the capability 
to produce, maintain, and man a large fleet independently, these strategic con-
straints will continue to hinder its attempts to become a sea power.
Then there is the fact that the Israeli defense establishment, as well as its politi-
cal leadership, still is dominated by officials who have limited knowledge of the 
sea or naval operations. In October 2019, this land-focused defense establish-
ment proposed canceling part of Israel’s naval buildup and reallocating the funds 
to ground forces and air defense.99 As these examples show, planned expansions 
to, or even maintenance of, the existing Israeli navy will continue to be a struggle.
As a high-profile 2016 report states, “It is . . . impossible to overstate Israel’s 
interests in maritime security. Yet, surprisingly, the maritime domain is almost 
absent from public discourse in Israel, a nation not known for its maritime cul-
ture or history.”100 Classic sea-power theory would argue that it will be difficult 
for Israel to provide the sustained resources necessary to secure its maritime 
interests under those circumstances. If Israeli leaders are serious about building 
sea power, they probably need more than a few new ships. To build the national 
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expertise and devote the resources required for creating sea power, Israel will 
need to develop popular support for such projects. To do so, it will need to infuse 
Israeli society with maritime culture. Considering Israel’s history, that will not be 
an easy task.
If history is a judge, the Israeli navy will have difficulty meeting the challenges 
it faces. While Israel may be devoting more resources to its navy, others are too—
the eastern Mediterranean currently is in the midst of a naval arms race. The 
Egyptian and Turkish navies already dwarf Israel’s in terms of size. Not only are 
they both rapidly expanding quantitatively, but they are moving toward aircraft 
carrier–based fleets. The Russian navy also has shown an increasing interest in 
the area.
Additionally, if Israel weds its energy interests to an undersea pipeline running 
to Italy and beyond or to LNG shipments from Egypt to Europe, Israel’s critical 
maritime interests will extend hundreds of miles from its shore; this will be a 
major change for a navy that so far has been concerned with defense of Israel’s 
two-hundred-mile EEZ.
Thus, even an Israeli navy that can meet today’s challenges likely will be inade-
quate in the near future. Israel will need to devote even more resources to its fleet.
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